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Fernando's ¡nternal policy of fostering the communities of Muslims, or Mudejars, 
in the territories of his own Crown of Aragón seems at odds with a foreign policy which 
invoived crusades against the Islamic states of Granada and the Maghrib, and encoun-
ters with the Ottoman Turks further east. This contradiction can be explained partly 
by the unión of two Crowns with somewhat divergent interests. Whereas Isabel's Cas-
tile supplied the Ímpetus and the majority of the manpower for the crusades, still vital 
in Aragón were the habits of Mediterranean frontier life, which admitted the neces-
sity of minority enclaves and ¡mpelled Catalán and Valencian toward the Maghrib and 
Granada for commerce (1). Nevertheless, as he engaged in a protracted struggle with 
Islam, Fernando was not blind to the potential Muslim menace at home, particularly 
in the kingdom of Valencia, where the Mudejars comphsed roughly thirty per cent 
of the population. There, the history of Mudejar rebellion and ambivalent loyalty to 
the Crown afforded the king little cause for comfort (2). Moreover, earlier anti-Muslim 
violence on the part of Christians suspicious of Mudejar intentions suggested a possi-
ble threat to the public order (3). As recent as 1455, the morena of the city of Valen-
11) Discussions of Fernando's foreign policy nave not given enough attention to his internal policy as an indication of his moti-
ves and priorities. The view that Fernando was motivated solely by a desire to crusade against Islam, presented by JOSÉ 
M. DOUSSINAGUE, La política internacional de Fernando el Católico (Madrid, 1944), does not jibe with Fernando's con-
sistent encouragement of Mudejarism m the lands of the crown of Aragón. J . N. HILLGARTH, The Spanish Kingdoms, 
v. II (Oxford, 19781, pp. 534-584, presents a more balanced view of Fernando's Mediterranean policy, in which confron-
tation with Islamic powers and the furthering of Aragon's Mediterranean interests often coincide. 
(2) ROBERT IGNATIUS BURNS, Islam Under the Crusaders (Princeton, 1974), pp. 37-45, discusses thirteenth century Mude-
jar revolts; and JOHN BOSWELL, The Boya/ Treasure (New Haven, 1977), pp. 372-400, treats Mudejar rebellion and 
defectíon during the mid-fourteenth century wars with Castile. 
(31 ROBERT IGNATIUS BURNS, «Social Riots or the Christians-Moslem Frontier: Thirteenth Century Valencia», American His-
torical Review. 66 (1969), pp. 378-400; and MIGUEL GUAL CAMARENA, «Los mudejares valencianos en la época del 
Magnánimo», IV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón, I (1959), pp. 473-474, list ¡nstances of Christian violence 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
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cia had been assaulted by mobs distressed by severe economic hardship and fearful 
of a rumored Nasrid offensive with an attendant Mudejar rising (4). 
In thís paper we will discuss how conflicts with specific Muslim foes affected Fer-
nando's perception of and policy toward his Muslim subjects in the kingdom of Valen-
cia, and how the Mudejars themselves responded to the intensification of the peren-
nial confrontation between Christianity and Islam. 
Of the Islamic powers which Fernando had to face, the expanding empire of the 
Ottoman Turks posed the greatest threat. The danger peaked in August, 1480, when 
the torces of Mehmet the Conqueror captured Otranto on the Italian mainland, pos-
sibly as a prelude to the conquest of Sicily, an Aragonese possession, and of Rome 
itself. The crisis passed when the death of Mehmet compelled a Turkish withdrawal 
from Otranto in September, 1481. 
During these critical months, Spain's ascendancy over Islam in the west suddenly 
seemed precarious. Turkish advances rendered the sultanate of Granada more formi-
dable and the allegiance of Fernando's Muslim subjects more uncertain. Fernando 
was anxious about the possibility of a Mudejar reaction in Valencia to Ottoman suc-
cesses. In December, 1480, he reminded his officials of the Turks' entry into Italy 
and then, noting Valencia's proximity to Granada, fretted over the fact that his king-
dom had such a large number of Muslim inhabitants who were well armed and had 
access to its castles. Having had to postpone the crusade against Granada to counter 
the Turkish menace, Fernando determined at least to neutralize the Mudejars, lest 
they should «...make some effort in our disservice and of our Lord God and in damage 
of that kingdom». He ordered that all Muslims in the kingdom be disarmed and denied 
access to or custodianship of castles, so that «...we may be without any fear of the 
said Moors (5)». 
However, Fernando added that his officials should act as they deemed best, with 
out causing any «...inconvenience orscandal (6)». In effect, this meant that they could 
do very little. Although arms control could be exercised in royal cities and towns (7), 
seigneurial opposition made it unfeasible in the baronies where the m'ajority of Mus-
lims resided (8). Indeed, documents from 1487 and 1502 describe the Mudejars as 
still armed to the teeth (9). Lacking evidence of Mudejar activity suggesting insurrec-
(41 GUAL, .'Mudejares», pp. 472-494, givesan accountof the attackand notes that, a few days after, thecry «moros venen!» 
sent armed men scrambling to the city's walls. JOSÉ HINOJOSA MONTALVO, «Las relaciones entre los reinos de Valencia 
y Granada durante la primera mitad del siglo XV», in Estudios de Historia de Valencia (Valencia, 19781, pp. 101-103, 
sees the assault on Valencia's morería in 1455 as resulting from the fear of a rumored Nasrid offensive, and notes that 
the jurats of Valencia described the Mudejars as «nostres enemichs publichs». 
[51 ACÁ: C 3605. 87r (13 December, 1480): «...no ignoran la entrada del Turch en la Italia per la qual cosa ab diligencia 
e gran sollioitud se deíveln entendre en fer los provisons degudes per forma que en nostres regnes e terres per negligentia 
e no cura se seguís algún ¡nconvenient e perqué vosaltres no ignoran aquex nostre Regne de Valencia quanta vícinitat 
te al Granada y quant gran nombre de moros hi habiten los quals segons soms informáis teñen moltes armes e teñen 
entrada y participi en alguns castells e fortalezes. E porias sdevenir que ab aqüestes novitats del Turch fessen qualque 
assaig en deservey de nostre Senyor Deu e nostre e dan de aqueix Regne. Per go... havem deliberat que vosaltres pensen 
per quina via mrllor o pus tanta e cómoda sense inconvenient o scandel algu se poran levar totes les armes ais mors habi-
tants en aqueix Regne axi en ciutats viles e fochs nostres com de barons e de ecclesiastichs. E que sia prohibit ais dits 
moros entrar en fortalezes... E si alguns moros teñen alcaydies de alguns castells que sia provehit que aquells los sien 
llevades per forma que sense recel algu deis dits moros puixam star...». 
(6) ACÁ: C 3605: 87r. 
(71 ARV: B 1156: 874r-v (12 October, 1480), and ARV: B 1157: 265v-266r (27 June, 1482), are examples of licenses for 
bearing arms granted to Muslims. ARV: B i 160: 270r (16 August, 1491): the justice of Onda confíscales Muslim's arms. 
(8) AMV: g3 29: 247v-248r (15 February, 1481). While informing Fernando of their own concern about the Mudejars' inten-
tions in the wake of Turkish successes, the jurats of Valencia noted that the seigneurs would prefer to maintaín the «status 
quo» instead of taking action against the Mudejars: «E iatsia que los qui teñen heretats poblades de moros volrien ques 
lexasa benefici de natura empero axi per... benefici deldit Regne de Valentía es mílor proveyrhi perqué lo dit vostre Regne 
sia preservat de irreparable ruyna». 
(9) ACÁ: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487): «...cascun moro segons se díu te en sa casa armes sobrades moltes mes de les que 
cascu dells ha mester». ARV: C 650: 242r-243v (12 April, 15021. 
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tlon, royal officials kept only a cautlous eye on the Moors without unnecessarily upset-
ting them by the applícation of a firm hand. 
The Turks contlnued to preoccupy Fernando throughout the 1480s, and, so long 
as Islam was politically alive ¡n Granada, the Mudejars remalned a related, though 
by no means constant, concern. In 1487 Fernando received disturbing information 
that the Mudejars had dlspatched two envoys to «the Turk», Bayezit II, to ¡nform hlm 
of Spain's war against Granada and to request support for the Nasrids before all was 
lost. The envoys had suggested that Bayezit send his soldlers to Valencia, and there, 
as ¡n the other Spanish klngdoms, 200,000 Muslims would rise up ¡n their favor and 
bring about the «...damage-and destruction of the Christians». The king's reaction 
was restrained. He ordered only a discreet investigation of the rumors. There survive 
neither responses to Fernando's queries ñor record of the punishment of Mudejar sub-
versives (10). 
The rumors seem ridiculous. Certainly, with his hands full in the east and ¡n Egypt, 
Bayezit was not in any position to mount an invasión of Spain and thereby lend subs-
tance to Mudejar plans. Nevertheless, this does not exonérate the Mudejars of the 
intention of rebellion under propitious circumstances. It is very much within the realm 
of possibility that Mudejar-Ottoman contact had, in fact, been established. 
By 1487 Nasrid poetic appeals for assistance reached both Ottoman and Mam-
luk courts. Bayezit responded by sendlng the privateer Kemal Reís to the western Medi-
terranean on a reconaissance mission. Reis based himself as a corsair in Bougie and 
Bóne and is thought to have made contact with Granadan Muslims somewhere along 
Spain's southeastern coast. The cióse ties between Valencian and Granadan Mus-
lims, the great concern for Granada expressed in the Mudejars' alleged embassy„and 
the embassy's temporal conjunction with the Nasrid appeal lead to the conjecture 
that Mudejar envoys in the company of Granadan counterparts met not with Bayezit, 
but with Kemal Relson either-the Andalusia-n or the Maghriban coast (11). The Mudejars 
were certainly in touch with Ottoman corsairs by 1502 (12). Earlier contacts, while 
there was still some hope for the Nasrids, do not seem improbable. In any case, once 
Granada was conquered, the threat of an Ottoman invasión in relief of the Nasrids 
was removed, and with it the possibility of a large-scale Mudejar insurrection. 
The initial years of Fernando's reign saw a continuation of Valencia's trade with 
Granada and the Maghrib, in which Mudejar merchants played an important role (13). 
(101 ACÁ: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487): «E que axi matex havrien (the Muslim ajamas of the kingdom) elets e diputats dos 
moros per missatgers la hu de la morería de Xativa el altre de la de Paterna apellat Pacoret e aquells havrien tramesos 
al Thurch per notificarli la guerra que per nos se fa al dlt rey de Granada e la perdicio en que aquell ere si per lo dit Thurch 
no fos subvengut e ajudat, la qual ajuda havla esser tremetre ses gents en nostres regnes e signantment en Jo dit regne 
de Valencia en lo qual e en los altres li notificaven trobaria docents milia combatents moros qui de continent se levarían 
en sa ajuda e favor contra les crestians en deservey nostre e dan e destruccio deis crestians-.. vos... manam... que... 
reeban verídica informado redlgida en scrits de totes les damunt dites coses., e aquella closa segell orda e fe fahent 
nos trametan perqué vista puixam provenir sobre les dites coses degudament miganpant justicia en castich e punitio 
de les dits moros e morerias juxta los crims excessos e delicies que contra aquells e aquelles legitlmament se provaran». 
(111 RACHEL ARIÉ, L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1232-14921 (Paris, 1973), pp. 172-174, discusses the 
Nasrid embassyto the Mamlukcourt; andANDREWC, HESS. The Forgotten Frontier (Chicago, 1978), pp. 60-61, 228, 
treats the mission of Kemal Reis in response ío the Nasrid appeal. On a later and more serious manifestation of the con-
nection between Spanish Muslims and the Ottomans, see ANDREW HESS, «The Moriscos. An Ottoman Flfth Column 
in Sixteenth Century Spain», American Histórica! Reviuw, 74 (1969), pp. 1-25. 
(12) See below, note 53. 
(13) HINOJOSA, «Relaciones», pp. 111 -128, treats Valencia's commerce with Granada and Mudejar participation. For Fer-
nando's reign, ARV: C 707: 789v-790r (17 May, 1479), and 889v-890r (30 June, 1481), are examples of licesesgran-
ted to Mudejars for travel to Almería for reasons of commerce. ARV: B 1 157: 327r-v (23 October, 1481); and AMV: 
g3 29: 179r-180R (9 December, 1479), are examples of correspondence between Valencian and Grapadan officials con-
cerní ng the activítiesof Valencian merchants in Almería. JACQUELINE GUIRAL, «Lesrelations commerciales du royaume 
de Valence avec la Berbérie au X V siécle», Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, 10 (1974), pp. 99-131. ARV: C 707: 
791 v-793r (1 9 January, 1480), and 91 2r-v (24 November, 1484), are examples of licenses granted to Mudejars for 
travel to the Maghrib on commercial business. 
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There also persisted the accustomed nuisance of Mudejar collusion with the Grana-
dan «almugavers» and Maghriban corsairs who raided the kingdom in quest of booty 
andcaptives(14). In 1481, and again in 1483, Fernando deplored the fact that «almu-
gavers» were secretly entering Valencia from Granada and perpetrating many crimes 
agaínst the persons and property of Christians travelling on the kingdom's roads. The 
raiders were making themselves inconspicuous by mixing ¡n the Mudejar morerías. 
As a remedy, the king commanded that all Muslims travelling by unaccustomed rou-
tes were to be seized and brought before the bailiff general for judgement. The gui-
des, presumably Mudejars, captured in the company of enemy Muslims were to be 
punished in exemplary fashion (15). Entire morerías, the majority of whose inhabi-
tants probably turned a blind eye to the comings and goings of the Granadan visitors, 
would, therefore, escape chastisement. The measure had some success. Afew Mude-
jars were arrested for the crime of «collera» —the kidnapping of Christians for sale 
as slaves in Islamic countries (16) — , «almugavers» were captured (17), and Muslims 
travelling on prohibited backroads were apprehended (18). The depredations of the 
«almugavers» and their Mudejar colleagues ceased after 1483, when the escalation 
of the war against Granada forced the Nasrids into a defensive posture (19). 
Mudejar travel to the Maghrib for purpose of trade and visiting kinfolk (20), and 
the presence ¡n Valencia of Maghriban merchants (21) and Maghriban and Granadan 
(14) JUAN TORRES FONTES, «La Hermandad de moros e cristianos para el rescate de cautivos», ¡n Actas del I Simposio 
Internacional de Mudejahsmo (Madrid-Teruel, 1981 i, 499-508, discusses this problem, and the appendlx contains the 
text of an order of Isabel (21 May, 1483) demanding the punishment of Murcian Mudejars who protected Granadan raiders. 
(15) ARV: 8 1157: 119r-120r (15 September, 1481): «...considerat que de tots dies cometen molts e diversos dans per los 
camins del regrie de Valencia en les persones bens e mercaderies deis crestians vassalls e subdits nostres e altres passat-
gers... los quals son fets e perpetrats per alguns infeels e moros qui entren occulta mente amagada de les parts éter res 
de Granada en lo dit nostre regne de Valencia en lo qual per les grans moreries quey son augmenten de numero de gent 
pera fer majors dans... en detriment... e evident dan de nostres subdits e vassalls crestians com los moros vagen segurs 
per lo dit regne sens esser los fet dan aigu... ordenam ab la present provisio real... que tota hora e quant per qualsevol 
persones... serán presos qualsevol moros e les robes diners joyes entrant passant exint e tornant sen per lo dit nostre 
regne de nits o de día per vies insolites e camins no acostumats que les persones e bens deis dits moros... sien portats 
davant lo nostre batle general... eque aquell sia tengut judicar aquell tal moro o moros, que si algu o alguns adelils serán 
presos en la dita companyia de moros que aquell o aquells sien donats... a nos e a nostres officials perqué... justitia... 
sia administrada a castich de aquells e a example de les males gents...». ACÁ: C 3633: 117r-v 110 February, 1483), 
is a reiteration of the above provisión. Probably in relation to this problem was the royal proclamation made in 1481 
that all Muslims and Jews must symbols wear distinguishing them from Christian. ARV: MR 92: 321 r. In ACÁ: C 3665: 
20v-21r (5 December, 1486), Fernando explicitly cites the Mudejars's failure to wear symbols as being a factor which 
enables them, incógnito, to assauJt and kidnap Christians: «...se segueix que per no anar senyalats los dits moros ans 
vestits ¡ndifferentment com a crestians.. e sens barbes ni toques ni altres senyals de moros se fan de totes dies de moltes 
insults e desordens cativantcrestians e aquells injuriant emaltractant e jahentab crestianes...» However, by 1486, Christian 
captives, if they were, in fact, taken, probably would have been handed over to Maghriban rather than to Granadan Muslims. 
(16) ARV: C 126: 124r-v (3 March, 14801, and ARV: C 304: 71r-v (26 May, 1480), deal with cases of «collera», as does 
ARV: C 131: 90v-r {30 July, 14831: «Expositione per humili pro parte Ali Jabbeu ville de Asp vassalli... Joannis Roiz 
de Corella Comitis de Cocentayna Maiestatl nostre facta precipimus quemadmodum his jam elapsis diebus ipse inculpa-
tus delatus et accusatus fuit per Petrum Martínez Berganti procuratorem fiscí nostri de crimine intercipiendi et captivandi 
christianos scilicet quod sarracenis qui ex sarracenorum térra videlicet ex Reg.no Granate in Regnum nostrum Valentie 
uti fieri solet venirint ut christianos captivos secum adducerat consilium auxilium et favorem dabet atque prestabat». 
(17) ACÁ: C 3605: 85v-86r (7 December, 1480), deals with the case of «almugavers» captured in the lánds of the Infante 
Enrique, the Duke of Segorbe, although this was before Fernando's measures took effect. ACÁ: C 3605: 118r (28 Sep-
tember, 1481):.«almugavers» are captured in Murcia. 
(181 ARV: B 1157: 156r (7 January, 14821: Mudejars travelling on a prohibited route between Tibi and Cocentaina are appre-
hended. 
(19) This ¡ssuggested by the absenceof evidence of further «almugaver» activity. ACÁ: C 3649: 150v-151v (6 April, 1492), 
shows how well the kingdom's roads were controlled. Murcian Muslims could enter the kingdom only through the city 
of Orihuela. Thus, once the war had ended, the lord of the Valle de Ricote in Murcia asked that these travel restrictions 
be lifted. 
(201 See note 13. ARV: C 707 also contains numerous examples of Mudejars travelling to the Maghrib on family business, 
such as 796v-797r (12 January, 1480), a license to Azmet Gallinayre of Oliva to travel to Tunis «per recaptar una heren-
cia de hun parent seu que allí es mort»; or 914r-v (26 November, 1484), a license to Muhammad Perpir of Valencia 
tp go to Tunis «per veure hun jerma de aquell que te en la dita ciutat e per haver una herencia». 
(21) Guiral, «Relations commerciales», pp. 107-111. However, Guiral'sarticle needs some correction. Her graph and tables, 
pp. 123-124, 131, suggest that there were not any Maghriban merchants in Valencia between 1493 and 1502, when, 
in fact, the registers ARV: B 1160 (e. g. , 915v-916r), B 1161 (e. g., 15v-16r), and B 1162 {e. g., 123v-124r) contain 
safe-conducts permitting one year of residence in the kingdom to Maghriban merchants. 
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captives, some of whom, once ransomed, remained ¡n Valencia (22), provided Magh-
riban corsairs with a potential network oí spies and guides who could facilítate their 
¡nfiltration of Valencian territory. Although Mudejar insurgence of this sort was by no 
means widespread, it was sufficiently vexatious to prompt the bailiff general to prohi-
bit the ownership of fishing boats by Mudejars, so that they could not, under pre-
tense of fishing, lead corsair galleys to Valencia's shores (23). Indeed, a Mudejar of 
Cocentaina was captured ¡n the company of 100 raiders from Oran (24). Even more 
striking was the information that a Muslim from Oliva was piloting a corsair fleet (25). 
The absence of energetic royal action to curb such Mudejar activity can in part 
be explained with one of the arguments of Valencia's nobles against the conversión 
of the Mudejars in 1502. They maintained that Mudejars often advised Christians of 
the coming of corsairs (26). In 1503, while requesting that their Muslim vassals who 
had fled to the Maghrib be allowed to return to Valencia, certain lords emphasized 
that while their vassals were in África they did not capture Christians, rather they pick-
ed up information regarding «...the damage that the Moors from beyond would like 
to do (27)». Fernando, impressed, complied. Thus, the intelligence network between 
Muslims of opposite Mediterranean shores could work both ways, sometimes to the 
kingdom's benefit. 
The exigencies of the decade-long crusade against Granada did not drastically 
alter Fernando's Mudejar policy. Strategies were not adapted for the eventuality of 
a Mudejar rising in Granada's favor, ñor were preventive measures taken beyond the 
investigation of rumors. The Mudejars were not significantly disturbed in their local 
economic and social pursuits. The only restrictions imposed were those limiting Mudejar 
travel to the regions of the kingdom closest to Granada and the passage of Muslims 
between Valencia and the Maghrib. So as not to curb Mudejar commercial activity 
any more than was absolutely necessary, the restrictions were relaxed in 1491, when 
victory seemed at hand (28). The probable opposition of the nobility, capable of con-
(22) Vicenta Cortes, La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los fíeyes Católicos 11479-1516) Valencia, 19641, is 
auseful, thoughby no means exhaustive, treatmentof theproblem; and.Guiral, «Relatlonscommerciales», pp. 114-116, 
126-129. Also, see below, note 38. 
(23) ARV: C 596: 147r-v (7 June, 14941; «En aquestvostre Regne de Valencia de alguns anys en ca se son seguits grans 
inconvenients a causa que los moros que stan en les viles e lochs maritims de aquest vostre Regne de Valencia teñen 
ares e barques de pelxcar... e sots color de exercir la dita art de peixear sori receptáis en aquest Regne per aquells moros 
stranys ab fustes pera cativar los crestians...». 
(24) ARV: C 3 1 1 : 254v-255r (6 June, 1502): «...vos diem tacan del moro de Cocentayna que fonch presen la dita cavalcada 
quis diu tenin en la presa en cas que per justltia no naja a esser condempnat a mort per esser de la térra e trobarse ab 
losenemichs...» ARV: B 195: 65r-v (30 April, 1502): a captured corsair from Oran confesses that his party was guided 
from Guardamar ¡nland to Rojales by a Mudejar of Albatera. 
(25) AMV: g3 33: 249r (2 April, 1501): «...en Ora an armat sis fustes ...e que venen per pilot de Bablaguer moro de Oliva.» 
(26) ARV: C650: 243r (12 April, 1502): «...fins ara en aquest regne en lo temps que los moros no tenien recel...de esser 
forgats...ferse crestians...quant fustes algunes de moros venlen en aquest regne los moros del dit regne eren en avisa 
deis crestians com es vist per speriencia moltes vegades.» 
(27) ARV: B 1162: 428v-429r (1 April, 1503): «...nos ha seydo fecha relación los dichos moros al tiempo que se fueron no 
se levaron cristianos algunos ante dende alia han dado algunos havises del danyo que los moros de alende querían fazer. 
E que voluntariamente se quieren volver a vivir a esse Reyno como solían...» 
(28) Leopoldo Piles, «La situación social de los moros de realengo en la Valencia del siglo XV,» Estudios de Historia Social 
de España, I (1949), p. 258. notes that ¡t had been established by Alfonso V in 1418 that Muslims from áreas north 
of the Jijona River could not travel south of the Jijona or to Castile with out the permission of the bailiff general. The 
registers ARV: B 1156-1162, contain licenses for travel beyond the Jijona. The number of licenses granted during the 
years of my study are as follows: 
1479: 29 
1480: 25 
1481: 38 
1482: 34 
1483: 26 
1484: 30 
1485: 18 
1486; 22 
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1491: 70 
1492: 55 (42 may go to Granada) 
1493; 57 (25 may go to Granada) 
1494: 22 (13 may go to Granadal 
1495: 12 1 3 may go to Granada) 
1496: 9 1 2 may go to Granada) 
1497: 5 
1498: 8 ( 8 may go to Granada) 
trolling their own Muslim vassals, and the size of the Muslim population dissuaded 
Fernando from an excessively repressive policy that might have provoked a rebellion 
more quickly than the war itself. 
In general, Fernando was confident that Christian dominance in Valencia would 
circumscribe Mudejar disloyalty to the few who intrigued with «almugavers» and cor-
sairs. Given the weakness of the Nasrids before the combined power of Castile and 
Aragón, he could afford to be somewhat lax. It is significant that he becanne wary 
of the Mudejars only with respect to the Turks, the one Islamic power with substan-
tial offensive capabilities. The king's confidence was well-founded, for not a Mudejar 
sword was unsheathed in defense of the beleaguered Nassrid sultanate. 
Yet, it may be that the. Mudejars were more willing to empty their purses in sup-
port of the Nasrids. In 1487 it was reported that they had been sending large annual 
subsidies to the sultán since 1481. The fuqaha' (alfaquis), who were responsible for 
collecting the funds, were also leading their congregations in a prayer that beseeched 
God to exalt the sultán and to destroy Fernando and his hosts. The king, exasperated, 
ordered investigation and, if necessary, punishment (29). Although the documents 
are otherwise silent on this matter, it seems reasonable that, in lieu of military acti-
vity, Valencia's Muslim minority would have resorted to financial aid and prayer on 
behalf of that remnant of al-Andalus to which they were bound by religión and kin-
ship (30). Indeed, their effort to make contact with the Turks on the Nasrids' behalf, 
if true, is another indication of their deep attachment to the Granadan sultanate, Still, 
beyond the inaudible sinking of Muslim hearts, the fall of Granada had no further rever-
berations in Mudejar Valencia. 
1487: 17 1499: 13 (12 may go to Granadal 
1488: 19 1500: 2 ( 2 may go to Granadal 
1489: 13 1501: 2 (Castilian Mudejarsl 
1490: 6 1502: 1 
Taking into accout economic fluctuations —since the majority of the Mudejars travelled south for commerce— I have 
attributed the modérate decrease ¡n the number of licenses granted from 1485 through 1490 to a more stringent wartime 
policy. The sharp ¡ncrease ¡n 1491 perhaps reflects a reaction to the relaxation of the prevrous stringency. The conti-
nuing h¡gh level ¡n 1492 and 1493 can be attributed to post-war population shifts (Valencian Muslims retrieving relations 
for settlement ¡n Valencia, ransomed slaves already residing in Valencia returning to Granada for personal business, and 
Valencia's Muslims taking advantage of the opportunityjo visit Granadal, whereasthe marked decrease after 1495 per-
haps reflects a gradual cordoning off of the former sultanate as an aid to Talavera's missionary efforts. The mere trickle 
from 1500 through 1502 was due to the revolts in the Alpujarras and the conversión of the Muslims of Granada, Murcia, 
and Castile. 
Regarding the passage of Muslims between Valencia and the Maghrib, see note 2 1 . Guiral's data, «Relations com-
merciales,» pp. 123-124, 131, is accurate for the years before 1493. ARV: C 707 shows that between 1484 and 1491 
there were no licenses for travel to the Maghrib granted to Mudejars. There was a very sfight resumption of Mudejar 
travel in 1491: six licenses were granted, though three wereto Castilians and one to an Aragonese Mudejar. Unfortuna-
tely, there are no registers following ARV: C 707, which terminates in 1491 ..Given the fact that Maghriban merchants 
continued to come to Valencia throughout the 1490s, even during the years of the crusade against África, there is no 
reason why Mudejars should not have resümed their visits to the Maghrib, particularly when one considers that the majo-
rity of the Mudejars had been travelling to Tunis, with which city Fernando maintained consistent commercial relations. 
(291 ACÁ: C 3665: 20v-21r (5 December, 1486): Fernando mentions the repon that the kingdom's morerías were sending 
the the sultán an annual subsidy of the valué of the skins of the animáis they had killed- ACÁ: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 
1487) gives more detail: «Com siam ¡nformats que les aliantes de moros de aquex nostre regne de Valencia axi de rea-
lench com altres axi aliamalment com singularmente.de sis anys en ca havrien fets diversos socossos e subvencions 
de moltes quantitats de peccunia en grants sumes al rey de Granada...dipputant alfaquis e persones en cascuna aliama 
a plegar e rebre de cascun moro les dites subvencions e remetent les dites quantitats cascun any al dit rey perqué de 
aquells fos ajudaten sa deffensio e contra aquesta sancta empresa... encara los dits moróse los alfaquins de dites moro-
nes del dit temps de aquesta empresa en ca havrien ordenada una certa oratio e aquella fan de continuu en ses ores 
contenent en effecte que Deu exalte lo dit rey de Granada e que destruesta a nos e a totes nostres gents ab altres leges 
paraules de blasfemia que offenen les orelles.» See note 10 for Fernando's order that these rumors be investlgated. 
(30) Hinojosa, «Relaciones,» p. 104, suggests thatamong Valencia's Mudejars the Nasrid sultán exercised «...una ciertt jefa-
tura, teórica al menos, en el campo espiritual...», emphasizing that in 1455 the sultán had expressed considerable anger 
to the jurats of Valencia over the attack on Valencia's morería. One might also conjecture that Mudejars invoked the 
ñame of the reigning Nasrid in their Friday prayers. ARV: C 707, contains instances of Mudejars travelling to Almería 
on family business, such as Amet Biale of Castellnou, 786v-787r (12 May, 14791, or to study Arabio, such as Cahat 
Galip of Játiva, 820r-v (19 April, 1480). 
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Fernando's post-war pollcy was an expression of hls belief ¡n the continuing via-
bility of Mudejarism. Satisfied that Valencia had survived the shocks of the Granadan 
campaigns and the worst of the Ottoman threat without major incident, he encoura-
ged the settlement of Granadan Muslims in a number of Valencian localities (31). Also, 
he permitted Muslim travel from Valencia to the new kingdom of Granada (32). Unfor-
tunately, Fernando's relatively «liberal» policy was to be thwarted by the extremism 
of Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros. 
The Mudejars' quiescence during the war years can be explained by their aware-
ness of the realities of power which neither the distant progress of the Turks ñor the 
desultory raids of corsairs could change. The growth of Christian population in Valen-
cia —approximately seventy per cent of the total by the mid-fifteenth century— and 
the increasing solidification of the structures of Christian authority brought home to 
the Mudejars the futility of rebellion (33). Moreover, the debility of the States of wes-
tern Islam offered them little prospect of succor in the event of their rising (34). Only 
the Turks raised a faint glimmer of hope, but that quickly faded. Finally, more than 
tw.o centuries of life under Christian rule had inured them to their subject status. The 
conditions which had made the Mudejar bristle in the thirteenth century were accep-
ted with greater equanimity in the fifteenth. 
This is not to suggest that the Mudejars were insensitive to the plight of their 
fellows. On the contrary, they displayed considerable commitment and sense of res-
ponsibility for their Muslim brethren, but they did so in áreas where they could be 
most effective. Rather than making war, they aided prisoners of war; and rather than 
vainly rebelling against their Christian lords, they acted on behalf of the victims of 
oppression. Mudejars helped Muslim prisoners break out of seigneurial jails (35); they 
spirited away from brothels Muslim women forced into a life of prostitution (36); and 
at times they violently resisted the efforts of royal officials to punish members of their 
communities (37). Most ¡mpressive was Mudejar assistance to slaves and captives, 
which seems to have been organized among the kingdom's morerías. Runaways were 
hidden in the morerías and were given boats for escape to África. Captives were ran-
somed and then either sent home or welcomed as permanent community members 
(38). In this way the Mudejars met the claims made on them by membership in an 
131) Sonne examples are ARV: C 148: 214r-v (4 September, 1493): Fernando settles Muslims from the city of Granada on 
iands held by the bailiff general rcear Orihuela, and the new vassals swear to remain there for five years; ARV: B 1160: 
18v (28 January, 1491): Amir Algaras from the Valí de Uxó travels to Almería in order to bring back his mother and 
sister for relocation in Valencia; and ARV: B 11 59: 251r-252r (25 October, 14891' Muslims, originally of Vera, come 
from Oran to speak with Fernando regarding the settlement in Valencia of others Yrom Vera, still in Oran. 
1*32) ARV: 8 1160: 646v-647r (26 March, 1493): Fotaya Cot of the Valí de Uxó is granted license to go to Granada to study 
Islamic law. AR V: B 1160; 554v-555r (27 October, 1492): a family of ransomed slaves from Málaga is granted permis-
sion to return to Málaga to visit relatlves; they are royal vassals and will be returning to Valencia. 
(33) Regarding the change in the Muslim-Christian population ratio, I am, for the moment, following María del Carmen Bar-
celó Torres, Minorías Islámicas en el País Valenciano: Historia y Dialecto (Valencia, 1984), pp. 64-70. I have not yet 
drawn my own conclusions on this question, though I doubt that they will differ substantially from the 30:70 per cent 
ratio.Suffice ¡t to say that the thirteenth century situation of Chrlstians awash in a sea of Muslims had, by the mid-fifteenth 
century, reversed The decreasing incidence of Mudejar rebellion parallels the ¡ncrease in the Christian population. 
(34) Hess, op. cit., pp. 11-25, contrasts the political and military weakness of the Islam icwest with thestrength and gunpow-
der technology of (he unified Castile and Aragón. See also, Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge, 
1975), pp. 119-166; and Arié, op. cit., pp. 129-178. 
(35) ACÁ: C 3633: 79v-80r (25 February, 1479), and ARV: C 139: 72v-73v(19 May, 14951, discuss the attack of Muslims 
of Ressalany on Dos Aguas to free Muslims held prisoner there. ARV: C 148: 148v-149r 112 February, 1493): a Muslim 
¡s freed by coreligionists from the jail of the seigneur of Albatera. 
(36) ARV: B 1160: 1 7v (25 January, 14911. 
(37) For example, ARV: C 148: 142v-143v (25 January, 1493): the amín and jurats of Matet resist the efforts of the gover-
nor's officials to seize two Muslims who had fled from the place of Gaibiel. 
(38) One chapter of my doctoral dissertation will be devoted to the subject of Muslim slaves, both Valencian and foreign, 
and how the institution of slavery served, on the one hand, to define the inferior status of the Mudejar, and, on the other 
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international Islamic community without rashly inciting the wrath of a king whose power 
they could not hope to challenge. 
Despite all that has been said about the possibility of Mudejar disloyalty, one must 
not assume that all or even most of Fernando's Muslim subjects understood contem-
porary events in terms of Muslim-Christian confrontation, or that each one contem-
ptated what might be done for the cause of Islam. Beneath all the crusading rhetoric 
lay the weighty determinant of self-interest. In a world where «realpolitik» was as ¡mpor-
tant as ideology in the formation of alliances (39), where Granadan and Maghriban 
Muslims preferred to remain in Christian Valencia (40), and where Christians smug-
gled arms to Muslims and piloted their ships (41), ¡t is no great wonder that most 
Mudejars were reluctant to risk physical security in Valencia in support of a divisive 
Maghrib or a declining Granada. Even within Valencia Muslims expended as much 
energy in internecine quarreling and family feuding as they did in cooperative defiance 
of Christian authority (42). 
The rumblings of change and the origins of crisis for Valencia's Mudejars issued 
neither from the crusades against Islam ñor from within Valencian society itself, but 
from Granada and Castile where Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros were eliminating Mude-
jarism. Cisneros' brand of conversión by coerción sparked Muslim revolts in the Albaicín 
and in the Alpujarras through 1500 and 1501. Once the revolts were quelled Gra-
nada was completely «Christianized», and by February, 1502, Castile's Mudejars were 
offered the choice of baptism or expulsión (43). 
If Fernando thought that his own kingdoms could remain immune to this tragedy 
of conflict and conversión, he was grievously mistaken. Certain elements of Valen-
cia's Christian populace, who had abstained from anti-Mudejar violence despite the 
continual preaching of the crusade against Islam, began early in 1500 to murmur that 
Valencia's Muslims ought to convert, either voluntarily or by compulsión (44). These 
hand, to strengthen the bonds of group solidarity within the Mudejar community and between that community and the 
wider Muslim world. Some pertinent documents are: ARV: B 1431: 374r 131 October, 1493): the bailiff general recogni-
zes that the problem of runaway slaves is great owing to the aid the runaways receive from other Muslims; Afl V: C 650: 
251r-253r (6 July, 15021: Fernando's lieutenant in the kingdom orders a general investigaron of Mudejar assistance 
to runaways; ARV: C 127: 125v (27 May, 14801: one of several instances in which a runaway disappeared in the more-
rías of the kingdom; ARV- C 156: 200r-v (19 April, 15021: Muslims of Deniagivetothree runaways a boatand provisions 
to make their escape; ARV: 8 219: 239r-240r (13 October, 14881: one of the more interesting of the numerous cases 
of Mudejars buying or ransoming captivas, in which the aljama of Valencia purchases nineteen Malagan captives, all 
over sixty years of age; and ARV: B 1431: 344r-375r (14931: the case of a íaqlh from Tunis who remained in Ondara 
after having been ransomed by its aljama. 
139) This was long the case in the westem Mediterranean. For instance, see Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq, L'Espagne cata-
lañe el te Maghrib au Xllle et XlVe siécles (Paris, 19661, and Abun-Nasr, op. cil., pp. 119-166. That ¡t continued to 
be so is ¡ndicated by Fernando's alliance with the Mamluks against the Ottomans, and by the rerouteing of his African 
crusades toward Naples when it suited his ¡nterests. One ¡mportant change was the unión of Aragón and Castile, which 
rendered the Nasrids incapable of playing off one Christian kingdom against the other. 
(401 See notes 31 and 38. 
(411 This was another established Mediterranean practice. See Robert Ignatius Bums, «Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp 
Businessmen; The Thirteenth Century Spaniard in the Cause of Islam,» Catholic Histórica! Review, 57 (1972), 341-366. 
ARV: B 1158: 73v (30 August, 1485): arms intended for illicit sale in the Maghrib are found on a Christian, ship; and 
ARV: C 650: 253r-v (18 July, 1 502): Johan Andreu of Ibiza is reponed to be piloting a corsaír fleet gathering in Bougie 
and Algiers. 
(42) Divisiveness within the Mudejar community is another theme I will treat in a sepárate chapter. It is abundantly clear from 
the documentaron that the victims of Mudejar violence were most often Muslims, not Christians. One example is ARV: 
C 129: 142v-143v (13 September, 14811: Yüsuf Cabot, a royal vassat in Játiva, originally from Valldigna, returns to 
the valley and, with accomplices, murders a Muslim of Tavemes. The registers ARV: B 217-221 contain official truces 
established between feuding Mudejars. 
(43) Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Los Mudejares de Castilla en tiempos de Isabel I (Valladolid, 1969), pp. 69-82; and Hill-
garth, op. cit., pp. 470-483. 
(44) AMV: g3 33: 214r (29 February, 1500): the jurats of the city of Valencia inform Fernando of this problem. Regarding 
the question of popular Christian response to the preaching of the crusades in Valencia, although Fernando had to repri-
mand preachers in Zaragoza for inciting the populace against the Mudejars —ACÁ: C 3605: 136r (13 April, 1482), and 
ACÁ: C 3567: 152r (8 February, 14961— this does not seem to nave been a problem in Valencia. Only Maghriban mer-
chants were assaulted, probably as a result of the preaching of the crusade against África, and royal proclamations against 
this were made in 1496 and 1497: ARV: MR 106: 245r (1496), and ARV: MR 107: 245r (14971. 
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rumor-mongers, approving of Cisneros' methods and perhaps frightened that Mus-
lim rebellion would spread to their kingdom, threatened to foment a wave of anti-Musüm 
violence. Fernando responded quickiy and placed all the moreríias of the kingdom under 
special royal safeguard. He declared the principie that «...our holy Catholic faith in 
the conversión of the infidels admits neither violence ñor any forcé but complete free-
dom and devotion». Anyone daring to say the contrary or to inflict physical or verbal 
abuse on the Muslims was to be punished (45). The king had to issue the same order 
for Catatonía (46}, and again for Valencia in 1502 (47). 
In April, 1502, the nobles of Valencia informed Fernando that the Mudejars were 
gripped by two great fears: that they would be forced to convert or emigrate as were 
their coreligionists in Castile; and that the Inquisition was going to proceed against 
them for dissuading their fellows from baptism and for maintaining that Islam was 
a better religión (48). Having already admonished the Inquisitors, the nobles remind-
ed Fernando that the Mudejars were the economic foundation of the kingdom with-
out whom it would crumble. Already the distraught Muslims had stopped working 
and paying their rents. Instead, they were selling their property and hiding their goods 
in mountain caches. Those who had access to boats were leaving the kingdom (49), 
Worse still, the Mudejars were being driven to the brink of violence. The nobles 
warned that there were more than 22,000 households of Muslims who were well 
armed, had an intelligence network, and lived near impregnable mountain fastnes-
ses. An imprudent move on the king's part could result in the deaths of Christians 
145) ACÁ: C 3655: 34r-v (5 March, 150CH: «Anostra noticia es pervengut que algunes malivoles persones les quals no mogu-
des per zel de la honor de nostre Senyor Deu no de la religio christiana mas per algunes sinestres e graves intencions 
han seminat en Jos pobles de aquex Regne que seria e es nostra intencio e voluntat per forca reduyr a la sánela fe e 
religio christiana tots los moros -del dit Regne e encara sembrant altres coses preparades a grans scandals per moure 
los pobles contra los dits moros e cercar ocasions de alvolotar e levarse contra ells, los quals tement aqüestes novitats 
... los dits moros se retrahen de no exir de ses poblacions ni de negociar ni comerciar segons accostumaven per no esser 
dampnificats en llurs persones e bens. Les quals coses son...tant contraríes a nostra intencio e voluntat com la nostra 
sancta fe catholica en la conversio deis infe.els no admeta violencia ni forca alguna sino summa libertat e devocio. E 
per co declaran! vos la intencio e voluntat nostra e volents que los qui tal dien sien castigats e punits e que los dits moros 
sien preservats.-.prenem e posam en nostra protectio e salvaguarda real totes les moreries...del dit nostre Regne e tots 
los poblats e habitants en aquelles...e que nengunes persones...no gosen ni presumesquen ño atienten de maltractar 
de fet ni de paraules ais dits moros,..ni parlar de la conversio de aquels ni ferlos dany en llurs persones ni bens...E si 
per algu o alguns ab osadía temeraria los sera feta o dita injuria alguna de feto de paraula...ultra les penes que per furs 
del dit nostre Regne de Valencia...incorreguen en totes aquelles qui son introduydes e disposades contra los qui rompen 
nostra salvaguarda real...» ACÁ: C3614: 53v-54r (26 March, 1500): Fernando assures the Infante Enrique that the rumors 
are false and that no action will be taken against the Mudejars. 
¡46) ACÁ: C 3600: t76v-177r (30 September, 1501). 
(47) ACÁ: C 3600: I91v-192r (20 February, 1502)- Emilia Salvador, «Sobre la emigración mudejar a Berberia. El tránsito 
legal a través del puerto de Valencia durante el primer cuarto del siglo XVI,» Estudis, 4 (1975), pp. 61-63, transcribes 
this document, which is a reiteration of the order of 5 March, 1500. 
(48) ARV: C 650: 240v-242r 112 April, 1502): «...dues coses que han granment en los ánimos deis dits moros augmentat 
la pahor que aquells temen la qual james han deposada per nengunes provisions que per vostra Alteza sien stades fetes. 
La primera la crida que per manament de vostra Alteza es stada publicada en aquex Regne de Casteila que los moros 
dins cert tempsse ha ¡en a fer crestianso haien a buydar lo Regne..-La segona quels esstat persuadit a donat a entendre 
jatsia falsament que los Reverents Inquisidors de la herética pravitat volen inquirir e procehir contra los moros de aquest 
Regne...La qual cosa ha causat en l'animo de aquells tan gran spant que tots stan fora de si matexes perqué dien que 
de apo negu dells sen pot scusar perqué publicament han tengut e teñen en lo present Regne ses mezquites e sos alfa-
quins los quals publicament los presiguen que la secta de Mahomat es millor que no la ley deis crestians. ,e que de acó. ..que 
se ha de seguir que ells per forca se haien a fer crestians o que sen hagen a fogire anar tots del present Regne...E final-
ment nos ha paregut a tots que deviem los persones quesom stades eletes per los ditsStaments (military and ecclesiasti-
cal) parlar ais Reverents Inquisidors...notificantlos que circa aquest negosi sab¡em...del$ recéis que los moros temen 
e del gran dan que los crestians de aquest Regne ponen rebre moventse algu avolot entre los dits moros...Nos han res-
post que la intencio dells no es lo que los dits moros se persuadexen.» 
(49) ARV: C 650: 242r-v (12 April, 1502): «...aquest Regne ab inhicio es stat poblat ab aqüestes heretats de moros e que 
tota la sustantia e patrimoni de les sglesies deis cavallers e deis ciutadans e altres habitants en lo dit Regne sta en lo 
fonament de aqüestes poblacions de moros e en la conservacio de aquells. E que la poblacio de aquells es tan gran en 
aquest Regne que qualsevol destruccio o depopulacio ques seguexca en aquell es perpetualment destruhtr aquest 
Regne...tots los moros de aquest Regne stan molt alterats e alborotats que no volen fer faena ne acudir a sos senyors 
a pagarles rendes com acostumaven e que tant com podem treballen en apartar sos bens en les montanyes e llochs 
non tienen ells son forts en aquest Regne e en vendré tot lo que poden...los que stan a la marina han furtades algunes 
barques. Les quals no sabiem...s¡ ab dites barques sen son pasats alguns en térra de moros.» 
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and Muslims and in the destruction of much property (50). Fernando had to convince 
the Muslims that Castilian Mudejar policy woutd not have a Valencian sequel. 
The king's initial response, an effort to freeze Mudejar movement, only caused 
more panic, since the Muslims saw this as a preliminary to their conversión (51). The 
untimely decisión of Fernando's lieutenant to conduct an inquiry into the Mudejars' 
abetting of runaway slaves had a similar effect. Muslims continued to flock to Valen-
cia's shores for escape (52). 
During these panic-filled months of 1 502 there carne to the -fore the Mudejars' 
contacts with Maghriban corsairs and their Ottoman allies (53). Muslím piratical acti-
vity noticeably increased in 1 502 and 1 503, as did the size and daring of their raiding 
parties (54). This was linked to peninsular events, since embittered Granadan Mus-
lims had been filling the corsairs' ranks (55). It is clear that when corsairs set sail to 
plunder and terrorize Valencia's coasts they also had in mind assisting the kingdom's 
Muslims. Guided by Mudejar ¡ntelligence, the galleys arrived and picked up the Mudejars 
waiting on the shore (56). 
It is significant that in this desperate situatton the Mudejars chose flight instead 
of armed rebellion. On the one hand, it reflects the Mudejars' sense of impotence 
before Christian power in Valencia. On the other hand, the willingness to abandon 
(50) ARV: C 650: 242v (1 2 April, 1 502): «...e ques preparen e provehexen be armes a que teñen ses inteliigencies ios huns 
ab los aítres per hon sospitam que no teñen neguna bona ¡ntencio.-.com h¡ haia pus de vint e dos milia cases de moros 
e que teñen moltes belles e forts places vent quels sia feta alguna forca o violencia en compellirlos a fer crestians via 
directa o indirecta no fagan algún moviment en aquest Regne que seria procurar algún irreparable dan. Car o segutnt 
sen morís de crestians o destruccio de llurs o morts deis moros o destruccio de sos benes en totes maneres es dan pera 
aquest Regne irreparable. 
(51) ARV: C 650: 247v-248r (24 May, 1502): «Car no obstant ques diga en la Real provisio que los moros no puguen desva-
salíar deis senyors de qui son vasalls e ferse vasalls de altres ni puguen vendré los bens sehents e encara mobles que 
teñen ne per lo semblant puixen teñir barques ni altres fustes pera pexcar ni entrar en la mar sots pena de cativs e altres 
penes. Encara queaquests remeys pareguen pnma fas..-profitosos e mostrants portar repos alsdits moros empero nosaltres 
qui tenim clara noticia deis recéis a temors que los dits moros teñen., .entenem que los dits remeys . .portarien.augment 
deis recéis que ios dits moros teñen...» 
(52) ARV: C 650: 251r-252v (6 July, 1502): «...a les portes de les mezquites deis dits lochs han afigit certs cartells ab ios 
quals citen e manen a les aljames e alamms veíls e noveíls deis dits lochs que per-tot lo propasai mes de Juny sien e 
compareguen en la present ciutat...per respondre davant la...Senyora Reyna (of Sicily, Fernando's lieutenant general 
in the kingdom) a qualsevol demandes axi civils com crimináis..-per raho de haver recepta ! .e amagat catius...Lo que 
ha fet grandissima operado en totes los poblacios deis dits moros perqué los dits moros dien que aquest modo e forma 
de procehir nos fa sino a fi de voier los incudir temors dient que las aljamas han delinquit e que per rembre la punicio 
del crim quels es imposat los sera forcat o de ferse crestians o buydar los Regne...tan gran es la temor de aquells que 
los dits cartells hun día de dijous foren afigits a les portes de la mezquita de hun lloch appellat Altea terme de Calp que 
es del noble Don Palafoix de Rebolledo e lo.disapte apres seguent sen anaren lots los vasalls e habitants en lo dit ioch 
moros los quals eren cent setanta...los quals sen son anats en dues fustes molt poques de Turchs...En apres de la fuyla 
de aquells se son fogits pus de vint e cinch vasalls de la baronia de Callosa...» 
(53) That the Turks were also involved is indicated in note 52 —«fustes molt poques de Turchs» — and ¡n the reports received 
by the jurats of Valencia from Ibiza - A M V : g 3 34: 4v (3 June, 1502), 10v-l 1r (16 July, 1502), and ARV: C 650: 253r-v 
(18 July, 15021— which mention «fustes de Turchs», as well as «fustes de moros» gathering in Bougie and Algiers. 
(54) AMV: g 3 33: 290v-291r (1 May, 1502): in response to the increased piratical activity, the capital and the other coastal 
towns of the kingdom establish a warning system utilizing smoke signáis to advise of the enemy's approach and the 
size of his torces. AMV: g 3 34: I71r-173r (30 August, 1503): Cullera is sacked by a forcé of more than 600 corsairs 
and more than 200 Christian captives are taken. There were other attacks of lesser dimensión, for exampíe, ARV: C 
311: 254v-255r (6 June, 1502): the town of Almoradi defends itself against more than 100 raiders from Oran and Tlemsen 
(55) Fernand Braudel, «Les Espagnols et l'Afrique du Nord de 1492 a 1577,» Revue Afrícaine, 69 (1928), pp. 203-208, sug-
gets that the crusade against África had as one of its motives the eiimination of the activities of Maghriban corsairs, 
among whom the refugees from Granada proved to be Spain's bitterest enemies. ARV: B 195: 65r-v (30 April, 1502): 
the testimony of a Granadan Muslim who became a corsair in Oran after residing in Paterna for some years. 
i56) AMV: g 3 34: 2v (27 May, 1502): «...fustes de moros venen a la vora de la mar al stany de Corbera e fan fochs...es 
gran dan de tota la costa per quant los moros de la costa se creu ques recullen e sen van en les dites fustes...» AMV. 
g 3 34: 11r (16 July, 1 502): «...de continu arriben fustes de moros e ab la ¡ntelligencia que teñen de alguns moros del 
present regne que nos partexen de les marines sen parten moEts moros de la Valí d'Alfandech e del Ioch de Piles..» ARV: 
C 650: 253r-v (18 July, 1502)''. regarding the report that eighteen Maghriban and Turkish galleys were preparing to sail 
for Vaíencia, the nobles note, «...los moros de aquest Regne stan tant comoguts per llur temor de esser forcats de ferse 
crestians que tots se lexaron anar com a desesperáis per recullirse en dites fustes, Maiorment que en aquest Regne es 
lo Valí de Guadales! e altres lochs per hon los moros poden arribar a mar sens empach algu e que se porien recullir co 
que teñen ells be percebut e practica!.» 
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their homes and possessions shows that for the Mudejars the freedom to practice 
Islam outweighed all other considerations. When forced to convert in 1 525, a num-
ber of Mudejars would resort to armed resistance (57). When, in 1503, Fernando 
restored calm and assured all parties in the Corts of Barcelona that Islam would conti-
nué to be sanctioned by royal authority, a number of Mudejars returned home from 
the Maghrib (58). As long asthey could practice Islam, Vaiencia's Muslims preferred 
to do so in Valencia. 
In conclusión, the international clash between Christianity and Islam did not nave 
¡n Valencia an impa.ct sufficient to unravel the resilient fabric of Muslim-Christian «con-
vivencia». The Mudejars did not express their identification with Islam by rebelling 
against their crusading king; ñor did that king harshly oppress his Muslim subjects 
while warring with Islamic states. The occasional Mudejar collusion with Muslim ene-
mies was borne as a customary feature of frontier life, an insignificant annoyance in 
comparison with the economic benefits accruing from the Mudejar presence. A key 
factor in explaining why Vaiencia's Christians and Muslims did not rise up in violence 
against each other in response to the promotion of crusade is that for them Christian-
Muslim conflict, on either the local or the international scale, was not anything new. 
Ever-present in the social formula of «convivencia» itself was the element of ideologi-
cal antagonism, which was either mitigated or aggravated by economic and social 
factors. Indeed, economic and social distress, the result of forces external to the fun-
damental religious difference, was usually most responsible for the eruption of vio-
lence (59). More novel than war with Islam was the harnessing of Aragón to the Cas-
tilian juggemaut, which, while it allowed for the final conquest of Granada, also unleash-
ed forces within Valencia that threatened its tradition of Mudejarism. Although the 
unión of the two Crowns set the stage for Spain's imperial achievements, it redirec-
ted the destinies of its constituent societies in sometimes tragic ways. 
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